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III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

The portion of this case on appeal involves a claim to quiet title to real property by
Appellees Jerry Losee and JoCarol Losee ("the Losees"). This appeal is taken from an order for
partial summary judgment entered November 19, 2007 by the Sixth District Conrt, Bannock
County, Idaho, in favor of the Losees, reconsideration of which was denied on December 19,
2007.
B.

Statement of the Facts

Sky Enterprises, LLC ("Sky") is an Idaho limited liability company, organized in
September, 2003. The initial management board of Sky consisted of the Losees, William F.
Rigby ("Rigby") and Ronald R. Warnecke ("Warnecke"). Defendant/Appellant The Idaho
Company ("Idaho Company") is an Idaho Business and Industrial Development Corporation, and
a 50% equity owner and member of Sky; the remaining 50% of Sky is owned by the Losees.
The business relationship between the Losees and Idaho Company began in
approximately August 2003 when JoCarol Losee approached Idaho Company President William
F. Rigby regarding financing for the Rite-Back device, an invention which the Losees were
attempting to manufacture and market. On September 23, 2003, a Membership Interest Purchase
Agreement ("Purchase Agreement") was executed between the Losees and Idaho Company. 1 On
that same date, a document titled Operating Agreement of Sky Enterprise, L.L. C. ("Operating

1

R., Vol. I, pp. 81-95.
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Agreement") was signed both by the Losees and Idaho Company. 2 The Purchase Agreement and
the Operating Agreement provided that Idaho Company would receive 50% interest in Sky and
the Losees would retain a 50% interest in the company. The Purchase Agreement required Idaho
Company to make some capital ·contribution to Sky but provided that Idaho Company could
satisfy this obligation by arranging for Sky to receive $135,000 in financing or as a line of credit,
as set forth in the Purchase Agreement, Section 2. 3
From September 23, 2003 to March 2004, the Losees were responsible for all accounting
functions and for management of Sky. During this time, the Losees spent Sky money .on items
not in the budget and for non-business-related expenses, to the financial detriment of Sky. In
March 2004, Idaho Company requested a review of the financial statements and accounting
procedures because reports were not being prepared and provided for review to the Sky
management board by the Losees as required by the Operating Agreement. The review was
conducted by Hal Latin and Daryl Snyder. They found significant and material failures and Mr.
Latin made a written report to Idaho Company. 4 Shortly after this review, Idaho Company took
over all accounting and all major check writing functions, hiring Ms. Snyder to head this effort.
During this time frame, the Losees asserted that they needed another infusion of capital to
complete the constrnction of the Sky manufacturing facility and get Sky set up for full scale
manufacturing of the device. Instead of seeking a business loan from a third-party lender, the

2

R., Vol. I, pp. 34-78, specifically p. 76.

3

R., Vol. I, p. 81.

4

R., Supp., pp. 32-33.
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Losees asked Idaho Company to increase the loan to Sky to $261,000. In exchange, they agreed
to pledge their real property, a residential home located in Bannock county at 9253 Frandsen
Road, Lava Hot Springs, Idaho (the "Lava Home"). 5 The Lava Home was the primary residence
of the Losees; it was also the site of the manufacturing facility constructed with loan proceeds.
The loan of$261,000 was granted by Idaho Company on July I, 2004 to the Losees and
also to Sky jointly and individually, and the Losees execnted a Promissory Note 6, Deed of Trust
on the Lava Home,7 and Pledge ofSecurity8 on July I, 2004 in favor ofidaho Company as
grantor of the loan. As is typical of secured lenders, Idaho Company recorded the Deed of Trust
on the Lava Home, as provided by Idaho law. 9
Sky began manufacturing the Rite-Back, and Losees hired employees to support them in
that effort. Shortly thereafter, it came to the attention ofidaho Company that the Losees had
hired an employee under the age of 16, as well as the Losees' 13-year-old daughter. Idaho
Company informed the Losees that Idaho law prohibited their hiring employees under age 16 to
work in a manufacturing operation; however, within a month thereafter, the Losees hired a 15year-old nephew. 10
As Snyder began working on the Sky books and records, it became apparent to her that
some invoices and/or receipts were missing, and that there were charges and debits for which the
5

R., Supp., pp. 19-22.

6

R., Supp., pp. 23-24.

7

R., Supp., pp. I 9-22.

8

R., Supp., pp. 26-30.

9

R., Supp., p. 14.

'°R., Supp., p. 86, II. 17-24.
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Losees had not provided supporting docwnentation. Snyder repeatedly asked the Losees for the
missing documents, and to support their contention that the charges were legitimate business
expenses. The Losees failed and refused to provide any documentation. Ultimately, Snyder
conducted her own investigation regarding some of the charges and came to the conclusion they
were not business expenses. She learned, for instance, that a $1,000 payment debited as "Maple
Street" was in fact to "Maple Street Sit and Sleep" for the purchase of bedroom furniture for the
Losees' personal use. 11
The business relationship between the Losees and Idal10 Company continued to
deteriorate, due to the Losees' misuse of company funds, failure to keep records, failure to
properly account for company funds, and other violations of the Operating Agreement and the
Losees' employment agreements with Sky. The funds Idaho Company committed to Sky were
exhausted. Sky was not earning any appreciable revenue. Several telephone conferences and inperson meetings were held in an attempt to address the problems; however, the Losees continued
to be unresponsive and uncooperative. On August 29, 2004, the Losees sent a letter to Rigby and
Warnecke stating, among other things, that they were opening a new bank account for Sky under
the Lo sees' exclusive control, and that they intended to "run this business on their own." 12
Lo sees did, in fact, open a new bank account, into which they deposited company funds. 13 They

"R., Supp., p. 92,119.
12

R., Supp., p. 14, ~ 16, p. 35.

13

R., Supp., p. 76, II. 7-25, p. 77, II. 1-17.
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utilized those fimds for their personal expenses. 14 On September 3, 2004 the Losees were
informed that Idaho Company would advance no further funds. 15
Idaho Company sent a letter to the Losees, again informing them that Idaho Company
would not advance any additional funds for Sky's operation, including salaries. 16 By this time,
Idaho Company had advanced $271,058.02. 17 Idaho Company also invoked the mediation
clause of the Operating Agreement, and requested the Losees participate in mediation as required
by that agreement. 18 A mediation was conducted on Friday, September 17, 2004 under the
auspices of Marvin M. Smith as mediator. An agreement was reached, wherein Losees had until
Friday, September 24, 2004 to arrange a buy-out ofidaho Company interest in Sky. 19
The Losees failed to arrange a buy-out. On October 11, 2004, a special meeting of the
board was held. Notice was duly provided to the Losees, but they failed to attend. 20 At the
special meeting, the Sky management board resolved to move operations from Lava Hot Springs,
Idaho to Idaho Falls, Idaho.
On or about October 13, 2004, Sky filed a Verified Complaint for Claim and Delivery in
the Sixth Judicial District Court of the State of Idaho, Bannock County Case No. CV-04-4501
OC. A Temporary Restraining Order was entered on or about October 15, 2004 in said action,
14

R., Supp., p. 78, II. 2-23; pp. 87-88.

15 R.,

sUpp., p. 14, 1[ 17.

16

R., Supp., p. 14, ,r 18, pp. 37-38.

17

R., Supp., p. 14, 1[ 19, p. 40.

18

R., Supp., p. 14, 1[ 18, pp. 37-38

19

R., Supp., p. 15, 1[ 21, pp. 42-44.

20

R., Supp., p. 15, 1[23, p. 45.
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!:

,,
I

restraining the Losees from interfering with the physical facility and operation of Sky. At a
subsequent hearing held October 27, 2004, a stipulation was reached between the parties. The
parties agreed (I) to dissolve the temporary restraining order; (2) to conduct a joint inventory of
Sky assets; (3) that the management board of Sky would consist of the Lo sees, Rigby and
Warnecke, and that a fifth member of said board would be jointly selected; (4) that a new bank
account would be opened at Ireland Bank for Sky, into which all business proceeds from sales or
any other source would be deposited; (5) that no money would be withdrawn from said account
except by agreement of counsel; (6) that each party would inform the other before accessing the
premises for any reason; and (7) the parties would keep each other fully informed of sales efforts
and the results of said efforts. The District Court approved the stipulation, and entered an Order
requiring the parties to abide by its terms. 21
The Losees failed to comply with the terms of the stipulation and order, and on January
24, 2005 the Court issued an Order to Show Cause directed toward the Losees. A show cause
hearing was held February 1, 2005. At the hearing, JoCarol Losee admitted that since the entry
of the order she had withheld sales documentation from her own attorneys and from Idaho
Company and that she had converted Sky funds to her own personal use. 22 Finding that the
Losees had violated the previous stipulation and order, the Court granted immediate possession
of all Sky assets to Sky, to be managed by Idaho Company. The Losees were prohibited from

!.
'I
21

I

R., Supp., pp. I 16-120.

n
··-R.,
Supp., pp. 124-12 6 .
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entering the Sky premises. 23 Thereafter on March 1, 2005, the court entered an order permitting
Idaho Company to move Sky property from Lava to Idaho Falls. 24

C.

Course of the Proceediugs Below

In February 2006, approximately one year after the management of Sky was vested solely
in Idaho Company, the Losees filed a new action in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial
District, Bannock County, CV-06-908, which contained myriad claims. The Losees asserted
everything from sexual harassment of Mrs. Losee to nonpayment of wages and breach of good
faith. 25 Among the claims was the claim for quiet title against Idaho Company, which forms the
basis of this appeal. Idaho Company and Rigby answered the Losees' complaint, and filed a
counterclaim alleging counts of mismanagement, conversion, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty,
and violation of previous court orders in the earlier action. 26
On February 22, 2007, the Lo sees filed a motion for partial sunnnary judgment, seeking
to quiet title in the Lava Home and set aside the Deed of Trust held by Idaho Company on the
property. The motion was heard on November 15, 2007, and on November 19, 2007 District
Judge Peter McDermott entered his Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment and Judgment,
certifying said order for immediate appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b). 27 Thereafter, Appellants

23

R., Supp., pp. 127-128, pp. 130-134.

2

''R., Supp., pp. 136-138.

25

It should be noted that nowhere in the complaint did either of the Losees assezt fraud against Idaho
Company, neither did they claim that their signatures on all of the pertinent documents were obtained by fraud.
26

R., Vol. II, pp. 277-292.

27

R., Vol. II, pp. 296-297.
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moved for reconsideration, which was denied on December 19, 2007. Appellants filed their
Notice of Appeal on December 24, 2007.

IV.
A.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Did the Appellees, as moving party, meet the initial burden of establishing the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact?
B.

Did the record before the District Court contain conflicting material facts which

would lead reasonable persons to differing conclusions?
C.

Did the District Court fail to construe disputed facts in favor of the non-moving

D.

Did the District Court commit errors of law in granting partial summary judgment

party?

to Appellees?
E.

Did the District Court fail to support its judgment with findings of fact and

conclusions oflaw?
F.

Should Appellants be awarded their attorneys fees and costs incurred herein?

V.

ARGUMENT

Entry of summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 28 In
determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, when there is evidence concerning
material issues in conflict, all allegations of fact in the record, and all reasonable inferences from
28

I.R.C.P. 56(c).
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the record, are construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment
motionc2

9

On appeal, this Court exercises free review in determining whether a genuine issue of

material fact exists and whether the moving party was and is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. 30

A.

Appellees Failed to Meet Their Burden

The burden of proving the absence of material factual issues is upon the party moving for
summary judgment,31 in this case, the Lo sees. They were required to show that there was no
factual dispute about the nature of the transfer of the $135,000 to Sky, about the loan increase to
$261,000 or about the events surrounding the formation and purpose of the Deed of Trust. But
the Losees did not meet this burden. Indeed, they provided no statement of undisputed facts to
the district court in their Memorandwn in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,

32

nor did they do so in any other filing. Rather, the record shows that on each of these points, the
Losees relied exclusively on the affidavit of JoCarol Losee in support of their claims. However,
the testimony in Mrs. Losee's affidavit is directly contradicted by her prior sworn testimony in
the previous litigation between the parties. Regarding the initial contribution of$135,000, Mrs.
Losee testified:

29

Brewer v. Washington RSA No. 8 Ltd. Partnership, 145 Idaho 735, at 735-36, 184 P.3d 860, 863 (2008).
Land O'Lakes v. Bray, 138 Idaho 817,819, 69 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Ct. App 2003).
30

Ada County v. Fuhrman, 140 Idaho 230,232, 91 P.3d l 134, 1136 (2004).

31

Id.

32

R, Vol. l, pp. 191-194.
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JO CAROL LOSEE: Well, it crune to our, when we first went into this together,
it was to our understanding that a hundred and thirty five thousand dollars, we
understood, was going to be given to us right up front.
MILLER:

Uh-huh.

JO CAROL LOSEE: Which it was not. We only got little bits here and there.
MILLER: Okay, stop there, if you would. What was the Idaho Company going to
get in return for that hundred and thirty-five thousand, the initialJO CAROL LOSEE: Fifty percent.
MILLER: Fifty percent of Sky Enterprise?
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes. 33

***
MILLER: When did you signed (sic) that?
JO CAROL LOSEE: We signed it, it was either January or February.
MILLER: Okay, now if you would turn to section, you don't even have to turn,
section two of that membership interest and purchase agreement. Could you read
the last sentence?
JO CAROL LOSEE: It is understood that the investor's capital contribution may
be in the form of assistance with obtaining the operating credit line for Sky
Enterprise, LLC.
MILLER: Okay. Now was that your understanding at the time you signed this?
Because you testified that the hundred and thirty-five thousand was to purchase a
membership interest, correct?
JO CAROL LOSEE: It was.
MILLER: Okay. Did you understand that those funds would have to be repaid to
the Idaho Company?
33

R., Supp., pp. 69-70, IL 21-12.
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JO CAROL LOSEE: Exactly.
MILLER: Okay. So with that initial hundred and thirty-five, it is your testimony,
was in the form of a loan that would have to be repaid?
JO CAR0L LOSEE: Yes.
MILLER: And it was also a purchase of an equity interest in Sky Enterprise?
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes, but we never received-34

***
MILLER: Okay. It was your testimony earlier than when you first got the
advance of a hundred and thirty-five thousand dollars, it was your understanding
it would get the joint venture, L.L.C., they'd take a fifty percent interest.
JO CAROL LOSEE:

Yes. But I didn't get the whole money up front.

MILLER: I appreciate that. You didn't get the whole money up front, but it was
your understanding, they were getting a fifty percent equity stake in the business?
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yeah.
MILLER: Okay. They would have necessarily gotten fifty percent of the profits,
too, right?
JO CAROL LOSEE: That would have came out of their, yeah, the distributions
35
after the loan was paid off.
The testimony of JoCarol Losee, given under oath in prior legal proceedings, establishes
that the Losees understood the form by which Idaho Company would purchase its 50% equity
interest in Sky. In addition, the Losees received the benefit of their bargain with Idaho
Company. There is no dispute that Sky received the $135,000 initial operating line and spent the

34

R., Supp., pp. 72-73, II. 8-25, 1-9.

35

R., Supp., p. 89, II. 6-22.
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whole of it; nor is there any dispute that those funds were expended during the time the Losees
were in charge of Sky operations and financial matters.
Regarding formation of the Deed of Trust, Mrs. Losee testified:
MILLER: Okay. There came a time when a hundred and thirty-five thousand
wasn't enough, is that correct?
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes.
MILLER: Why?
JO CAROL LOSEE: Becanse the molds were delayed for producing them.
MILLER:

Did the Idaho Company advance you further funds?

JO CAROL LOSEE:

Yes.

MILLER: From the initial hundred and thirty-five thousand dollars, were you able
to build the facility next to your house, the production facility? Was it done by
the time those funds were expired?
JO CAROL LOSEE: I don't know, because I didn't have track of how much had
been put into there. They had the running total of how much was all put in.
MILLER: Okay.
JO CAROL LOSEE: And it took more because of the cost of lumber that had
gone up and the price of building the facility, too.
MILLER: Okay. So it came to be an expensive facility?
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes.
MILLER: And the Idaho Company advanced funds to Sky to pay for that facility?
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes. 36

36

R., Supp., pp. 83-85.
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***
MILLER: Now let's turn to the deed of trust that I handed you, which I believe
is B. Do you recall signing that document?
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes.
MILLER: And what was the date you signed that?
JO CAROL LOSEE: July first, 2004.
MILLER: Also the date of the promissory note?
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes. 37
***

MILLER: Would you represent that this deed of trust is one of the things the
Idaho Company could have looked at for repayment of that two hundred and sixty
thousand dollar obligation?
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes. 38

***
MILLER: You granted your house as security for the loan from the Idaho
Company, is that correct?
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes.
MILLER: And you executed a deed of trust in favor of the Idaho Company, so the
Idaho Company could foreclose on your home, if needed, to collect this debt,
correct?
JO CAROL LOSEE: Okay.

37

R., Supp., p. 73, II. 11-19.

38

R., Supp., p. 74, II. 4-8.

39

R., Supp, p. 74, IL 18-25.
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***
MILLER: O!G1y. Would it be your belief that the Idaho Company could look to
your house as security as an alternate means of collecting that debt?

JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes. 40
Idaho law does not perrn,it a party to contradict by affidavit previous sworn testimony
within a summary judgment context.

41

The affidavit filed by JoCarol Losee in support of

plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment contradicts her previous sworn testimony, and should
have been disregarded by the district court.
The Deed ofTrust,
to Sky,

45

42

Promissory Note,43 Pledge of Security,44 ledger of disbursal of funds

and Rigby' s sworn affidavit testimony also challenged the Lo sees' assertion that they

were not aware that they were making a secured loan, 46 that they did not authorize a loan to
Sky,

47

and that they did not pledge the Lava Home for purposes of a secured loan.48 The

Appellees did not meet their burden, and partial snmrnary judgment should not have been
granted.

40

R., Supp., p. 75, II. 11-14.

41

Tolmie Farms v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 124 Idaho 607,610,862 P.2d 299,302 (1993); Keeven v. Estate of
Keeven (in Re Estate ofKeeven), 126 Idaho 290, 298, 882 P.2d 457, 465 (Ct. App. 1994).
42

R., Supp., pp. 19-22.

43

R., Supp., pp. 23-24.

44

R., Supp., pp. 26-30.

45

R., Supp., p. 40. Proof of loan payments on a $261,000 loan origination amount from July 2004 to June

46

R., Vol. !I, p. 197.

47

R., Vol. II, p. 197.

48

R., Vol.

2005.

n, p.

198.
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B.

The Record Before the District Court Contained Conflicting Material Facts

This Court has previously held that motions for summary judgment should be granted
49

with caution, and only in the narrowest of circumstances where the record before the trial court
contains no conflicting facts or inferences from which reasonable minds rnight reach different
conclusions. so Further, where there is ambiguity, such as in meaning of terms of a contract, the
ambiguity creates an issue of fact, which must preclude summary judgment. 51
In this case, the facts presented to the trial court could have led reasonable people to
different conclusions. Regarding the issue of whether Idaho Company satisfied its consideration
obligation under the contract, the Losees asserted, through Mrs. Losees' affidavit, that pursuant
to Schedule I of the Operating Agreement, Idaho Company was to contribute $135,000 in cash. 52
Mrs. Losee further alleged that Idaho Company never paid the $135,000. Idaho Company,
through the affidavit of Rigby, averred that Idaho Company did satisfy its capital contribution
obligation to Sky. Rigby provided proof that Idaho Company had arranged for a line of credit in
the amount of $135,000 for Sky, satisfying the requirements of Section 2 of the Purchase
Agreement. Rigby testified that Idaho Company was not required to contribute actual cash, as
the Purchase Agreement clearly provided that the "capital contribution" could take the form of
"assistance with obtaining an operating credit line for Sky Enterprises, LLC" which did occur.

49

53

Bonz v.Sudweeks,119 Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876,878 (1991).

°Kline v. Clinton 103 Idaho l 16, 645 P.2d 3 50 ( 1982).

5

51

Johannsen v. Utterbeck_ P.3d ~ 2008 WL 4595248 at 3 (2008).

52

R, Vol. II, p. 196, p. 249.

53

R., Supp., p. 13.
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In previous sworn testimony set forth supra, Mrs. Losee admitted the $135,000 was received and
expended, and further admitted she understood the capital contribution could be in the form of a
line of credit. This previous testimony directly contradicted her affidavit.
The Losees also asserted that the $261,000 loan was not "authorized" by them, should not
be considered a loan and did not provide a valid basis for the issuance of the Deed of Trust. Mrs.
Losee stated in her affidavit "the Defendants have also provided us with another
document. .. [w]e are not sure what this document is supposed to reflect - but it does show a
nUQ1ber of 'loans' begi1ming July 7, 2004, and continuing thereafter. At no time did my hnsband
and I authorize loans to Sky Enterprises." 54 Mrs. Losee also testified in her affidavit that she had
not intended to be involved in a loan and that she believed that the increased funding to Sky was
an investment or an "at risk investment," rather than a Ioan. 55 This is in direct contradiction to
Rigby' s affidavit and Mrs. Losee' s previous testimony. Rigby testified that the Losees asked
Idaho Company to provide a loan in the sum of $261,000 and that in consideration for said loan
the Losees executed a Promissory Note and Deed of Trust in favor ofidaho Company on July I,
2004. 56 A copy of the Promissory Note signed by both of the Losees was attached to Rigby's
affidavit and contained the following designations:
Debtor's Name: Sky Enterprises, LLC, Jerry Lee Losee, JoCarol Losee
Secured Party's Name: The Idaho Company
R., Vol. II, p. 197, 1 8. It should be noted that the exhibit attached to Mrs. Losee's affidavit is not the
balance sheet to which she refers to in the body of her affidavit but is a copy of the Promissory Note signed by the
Losees. It appears that the error occurred in the original and the district court did not receive this document as a part
of the affidavit of Mrs. Losee.
54
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R., Vol. II, p. 197.
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R., Supp., p. 13, 1114-6.
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.
Loan No. 007; Date: July 1, 2004; Amount: $261,000.00; Maturity: July 1, 2005; Loan
Fee: $0.00 57
The Promissory Note also contained the following language:
SKY ENTERPRISES ... JERRY LEE LOSEE, and JOCAROL LOSEE, after date without
grace for valued receiveµ, I, we, or either ofus promise to pay to the order of THE
IDAHO COMPANY ... TWO HUNDRED SIXTY_ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND
00/100 ... "
The Promissory Note and Pledge of Security attached to Mr. Rigby' s affidavit contains clear
indicia of a loan using the terms - 'Debtor', 'Secured Party', 'Secured Debt', and 'Security
Interest' on the face of the documents. 58 Rigby's testimony and evidence provides grounds upon
which reasonable persons could conclude that Idaho Company had granted a loan to Sky and the
Losees for $261,000. In addition, Mrs. Losee's previous sworn testimony, cited supra,
contradicts her affidavit and confirms that the Losees signed the loan documents, were aware
that they were personally liable for the loan, and knew that the Lava Home had been pledged as
security for that loan.
Mrs. Losee asserts that her "understanding" of the agreement between Idaho Company
and the Losees was that Idaho Company would supply all the "operating capital necessary to
operate the company [Sky]. .. " 59 Rigby points to both the Purchase Agreement and the three
documents 60 signed by both of the Losees which contain no such provisions. In its
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R., Supp., p. 23.
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R., Supp., pp. 23-30.
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Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 61 Appellants
clearly delineated disputed facts precluding summary judgment. 62 Appellants further brought
disputed facts to the attention of the trial court in their Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment or, in the Alternative, for Reconsideration. 63 However, the district
court failed to adequately consider the disputed facts.

It is not appropriate for a trial court, sitting in summary judgment, to malce factual
determinations where facts are in conflict. Likewise, the trial court is not to weigh the evidence.
Rather, the trial court's duty is to determine whether or not there exists any genuine issue of
material fact as adduced from the entire record. 64 In Kline, the parties had contracted for the
purchase of a large livestock ranch. The conflict arose because two different written contracts
had been drafted for the purchase of the ranch, and the parties never entered into a final written ·
agreement. 65 The plaintiff-purchasers urged the trial court to interpret the final contract to be one
which included oral modifications allegedly reached about four months after the initial written
contract had been drafted. Defendants claimed that the version advocated by the plaintiffpurchasers was not correct because there had been no full agreement to oral modification and
certain key terms which the plaintiffs asserted were in the final contract had not been defined.

61

R., Supp., pp. 46-138.

62

R., Supp., pp. 52-55.

6)

R., Supp., pp. 141-151.
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Kline, 103 Idaho at 121,645 P.2d at 355.

65

Kline, 103 Idaho at l 19,645 P.2d at 353.
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The plaintiffs sought recision of the contract and also a foreclosure of a purchaser's lien, which
had been filed against the ranch. 66
The evidence presented to the trial court at the time of summary judgment was unclear
and provided two opposing inferences. The defendants asserted in sworn affidavits that there
had been no oral modification to the contract and pointed out to the court that there was no
evidence that certain payments had been made by plaintiffs which would be indicia of the oral
modifications plaintiffs asserted had occurred. In contrast, the plaintiffs presented deposition
testimony, which provided there had b_een oral modifications and pointed to the fact that the
defendant had obtained financing, which they alleged supported one of the oral modifications. 67
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court stated that there was no showing
of a meeting of the minds to form a contract and that the plaintiffs had been required to show by
clear and convincing evidence the terms of any oral agreement, which they were unable to do. 68
The trial court then granted summary judgment and ordered that the purchaser's lien and lis
pendens filed by the plaintiffs be expunged. 69
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that while the trial court had applied the correct
standard of clear and convincing evidence to prove an oral modification, at the summary
judgment stage, the fi.mction of the trial court was not to weigh the evidence or to try the factual

66

Kline, I 03 Idaho at 1 I 9, 645 P.2d at 353.
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Id. at 121, 355.
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Id
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Id at 120,354.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

19

issues at all, regardle~s of standard.

70

The appellate Court found there were genuine issues of

material fact regarding whether the written contracts were orally modified creating an
enforceable agreement. In the Court's view, reasonable minds could have differed on the
accuracy of the testimony preseµted by plaintiffs and that asserted by defendants thus making
entry of summary judgment inappropriate. 71
In the case at bar, the district judge was faced with a situation where conflicting facts and
inferences were before the court through testimony and evidence presented by both parties. The
judge could not have reached a determination that the Deed of Trust was null and void without
making an underlying factual determination regarding the conflicting evidence before him. Such
a determination is appropriate only at trial before the finder of fact; even where the finder of fact
is the trial judge himself, he must wait until trial to malce determinations on disputed evidentiary
facts. The district court erred in granting partial summary judgment to the Losees.
C.

The District Court Failed to Construe Disputed Facts in Favor of the Nonmoving Party

In making the determination as to whether summary judgment is appropriate, when
evidence on material issues is in conflict, all allegations of fact in the record, and all reasonable
inferences from the record, are construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
summary judgment motion.72 In this case, the ruling from the district court does not provide

°Kline,

7

71

l03 Idaho at l2l, 645 P.2d at 355.

Id
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Brewer v. Washington RSA No. 8 Ltd Partnership, l45 Idaho 735, at 735-36, 184 P.3d 860, 863 (2008);
Land O'Lakes v. Bray, 138 Idaho 817, 8 l 9, 69 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Ct. App 2003).
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much insight into ho~ the district court construed disputed facts because the court failed to make
findings of fact or conclusions of law. It can only be inferred from the end result that the district
court failed to construe disputed facts in favor of the Appellants.
The district court dissolved the deed ohrust, holding it was null and void. This indicates
that the district court either found that I) there was no loan given to the Losees for $26 I ,000 as
consideration for the Deed of Trust; or 2) that the Losees should not be held personally liable for
the loan because the Operating Agreement did not permit such security or liability for
indebtedness. If the finding was the former, it flies in the face of the plai11 meaning of the
documentary evidence presented by the Appellants. The Appellants provided copies of the
document signed by the Losees titled "Promissory Note" which evidenced a loan amount of
$261,000, and which on its face designated Sky and the Losees as "Debtors" and provided that
both Sky and the Losees "promised to pay" to Idaho Company $261,000 at 4% interest. 73 The
Losees also executed a document titled "Pledge of Security" which secured a debt of $261,000 74
and a "Deed of Trust" which secured a principal obligation limit of $261,000. 75 These three
documents clearly evidence a loan by Idaho Company to the Losees and Sky for $261,000,
secured by a Deed of Trust in the Lava Home and a secured interest in the accounts receivable,
equipment, and inventory of Sky. In the absence of ambiguity, the documents must be construed
in their plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the wording of
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R., Supp., pp. 23-24.
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the instruments.

76

The plain language of these three documents can only be construed to indicate

they are instruments to create a secured debt.
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, incorporated into Idaho law, a lender
is permitted to take a security interest in property or collateral of a debtor after value is granted to
a debtor.

77

Idaho Company was entitled to ask for collateral to secure the loan of $261,000 if it

provided value to Sky and the Losees. There is evidence in the loan ledger that such value was
provided over a period of time from July 2004 to June 2005. 78 The evidence also indicates that
the Losees were well aware that they were taking on personal indebtedness through the J\1ly
2004 loan. The Promissory Note, which Mr. and Mrs. Losee personally signed, delineates on its
face that Sky, Mrs. Losee, and Mr. Losee are joint co-debtors. It provides" 'I,' 'we,' 'me,' 'my,'
or 'us' means each Debtor who signs" and "Sky Enterprises ... Jerry Lee Losee, and JoCarol
Losee ... for value received, I, we, or either o(us promise to pay to the order of the Idaho
Company ... $261,000 ... with interest thereon."

79

Fnrther, it should be noted on the signature

page of the Promissory Note and Pledge of Security, Jerry Losee signed twice - once in his
representational capacity for Sky and once as an individual. The Promissory Note gives clear
indicia that the Losees signed the loan for $261,000 personally, as individuals, and that both the
Losees and Sky intended to indebt themselves individually and jointly for the loan of $261,000.
Further proof that Mrs. Losee understood the nature of this transaction for the 261,000 loan and
76

Chavez v. Barrus 146 Idaho 212,219, 192 P.3d 1036, 1043 (2008).
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l.C. § 28-9-203.
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pledge of security of the Lava Home is found in the testimony of Mrs. Losee in the 2004
litigation where she said, under oath, that she was well aware that she, in signing the Deed of
Trust, had granted her house as security for the loan of $261,000 loan and that Idaho Company
could foreclose upon the home, Jf needed, to collect upon the debt. 80

If the district court believed that the Deed of Trust was invalid because the language of
Operating Agreement did not permit such indebtedness, this also would be an error. The
Operating Agreement, at Sections 4.2 and 6.15 provides as follows:
4.2 Each Member's liability shall be limited as set fotih in this
Agreement, the Act, and other applicable law. In addition, all debts, obligations
and liabilities of the Company, whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise shall
be solely the debts obligations and liabilities of the Company and, unless
otherwise provided in the Act, no Member shall be obligated personally for any
such debt obligation or liability solely by reason of being a Member. 81
6 .15 Except as may be otherwise provided by the Act of this
Agreement, no Board Member shall be (i) personally liable for the debts,
obligations, or liabilities of the Company, including any such debts, obligations or
liabilities arising under a judgment decree or order of a court, (ii) obligated to
cure any deficit in any Capital Account; (iii) required to return all or any po1iion
of any Capital Contribution; or (iv) required to lend any funds to the Company. 82
The plain meaning of 6.15 shows that the Operating Agreement intended to shield the
Members of Sky from personal liability relating only to the operations or operational
indebtedness of Sky. For example, if Sky became indebted for the purchase of materials to build
a widget, to purchase large quantities of office paper, or to procure building supplies to complete

'
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the manufacturing facility, the same would be the sole debt of Sky. Additionally, if a judgment
was entered against Sky in the context of a breach of contract suit, the same wonld not be the
liability of the Members. However, the plain language of 6.15 does not shield the Members if
they voluntarily take on debt for investment into Sky, such as capital contributions. For
example, if the Losees had personally sought a loan from a third-party lender, that lender would
not simply look toward Sky for security and repayment on the loan where the Losees were codebtors. The lender could be limited to seeking repayment from the company where it had only
loaned directly to the company, but where the borrowers or debtors included the Losees jointly
and individually, the debt became their joint and severable responsibility.
For purposes of summary judgment, the Operating Agreement should have been
construed in favor of the Appellants. Failure to do so was an error on the part of the district
court.

D.

The District Court Committed Errors of Law in Granting Partial Summary
Judgment to Appellees

1.

Quasi-estoppel.

The entry of summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 83 Even if
the trial court in this matter had found that there was a lack of genuine issues of material fact, the

83

1.R.C.P. 56(c).
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court erred in ruling that, as a matter of law, Idaho Company was not entitled to a Deed of Trust
executed by the Losees and that the Losees could not be held personally liable as a matter of law.
The Losees' claim for quiet title should have failed at the outset because Mrs. Losee
testified in the previous litigation that she knew that the Lava Home was being used as collateral
for the $261,00 loan and that Idaho Company could look to the Lava Home for security as an
alternate means of collecting its debt. Contradicting that testimony in the present case, Mrs.
Losee asserts that "[n]either my husband nor I understood that our execution of these documents
[Promissory Note and Deed of Trust] would amount to a lien against our home and real
property. " 84
The Losees' claims underlying the motion for summary judgment and the claim for quiet
title should have been barred under a theory of quasi-estoppel. Quasi-estoppel is properly
invoked against a person asserting a claim inconsistent with a position previously taken by that
person with lmowledge of the facts and his or her rights, to the detriment of the person seeldng
application of the doctrine. 85 Quasi-estoppel prevents a party from reaping an unconscionable
advantage, or from imposing an unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by changing
positions. 86 In this case, Mrs. Losee testified in 2004 that she knew of the nature of the Deed of
Trust and of the loan 87 and that she had granted her home as security for the loan from the Idaho

84

R., Vol. II, p. 199,114.
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The Highlands, Inc. v. Hosac. 130 Idaho 67, 70 936 P.2d 1309, 1312 (1997).
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Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 80 P.3d 1031 (2003).
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Company, yet she and Mr. Losee took the opposite stance in this current case filed in 2006. 88
The Losees' change of position from 2004 has damaged Idaho Company. Not only has it
resulted in this protracted litigation which has cost the company time and money to defend, but it
also led to the dissolution ofthe_Deed of Trust which was the Idaho Company's collateral for the
loan of $261,000. The trial court should not have permitted the Losees to take a position in this
matter contrary to the Losees' 2004 position in either bringing this suit or in granting summary
judgment on the matter of quiet title.

2.

Paro! evidence.

The rule against parol evidence provides that if a written agreement is complete upon its
face and unambiguous, and there is no fraud or mistake being alleged, extrinsic evidence of prior
or contemporaneous negotiations or conversations is not admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add
to or detract from the terms of the written contract. 89 Further, the parol evidence rule is a
doctrine of contract law which forbids the consideration of extrinsic evidence to contradict the
terms of a written, integrated contract that the parties intend to be a final statement of their
agreement. 90 However, in the case of an ambiguous contract or contract term, parol evidence is
admissible to clarify the ambiguity. 91
In this case, there was not an ambiguous contract. The agreements, consisting of the
Purchase Agreement, Operating Agreement, Promissory Note, Pledge of Security, and Deed of
88
89

R., Vol. !I, p. 197, 1f 8, p. 199, ,r,r 14-15.
McKoon v. Hathaway, 146 ldaho 106, 11 l, 190 P.3d 925,930 (Ct. App., 2008).
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Trust, were written documents signed by the parties. The plain lanfo>uage of the Deed of Trust,
Promissory Note, and Pledge of Security provide that the Losees, individually and collectively
pledged the Lava Home as security for an amount of debt equal to $261,000. Nowhere within
the documents was there any clause that the Deed of Trust would not be recorded nor that a lien
wonld not attach to the Lava Home. Thus, information about what Idaho Company intended to
do with the Deed of Trust and Pledge of Security after the signing is irrelevant.
Yet, the trial court permitted Mrs. Losee to present testimony through her affidavit
regarding alleged oral stipulations, agreements, or negotiations made prior to the execution of the
Promissory Note and Deed of Trust. Mrs. Losee asserted in her affidavit that prior to actually
signing the "Note and Deed of Trust" she and her husband were told by Rigby that the
documents were "merely for documentation purposes" and that the same "would not be
recorded." She also stated that "(w]e were shown a document purported to show the advances
made by Defendants [Appellants] to date. The Note we were asked to sign exceeded that
amount. Mr. Rigby told us the extra sum was to cover additional advances." Mrs. Losee went on
to state "Mr. Rigby told us he knew we were then refinancing our home and did not want to
.
" wit
"ht!mt process. ,,92
mtenere
The Losees, through the testimony of Mrs. Losee, were allowed to vary the terms of the
Promissory Note and Deed of Trust with extrinsic evidence, which is not permitted under Idaho
law. It was error for the district court to allow or consider this parol evidence.

92
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3.

Consideration.

The Losees came to Idaho Company in the spring of 2004 to request additional funding,
Idaho Company did not go to the Losees.

93

In fact, the Losees requested that the original credit

line of$135,000 be nearly doubled. JoCarol Losee testified she was aware that the Losees were
pledging their personal residence as security for the debt. 94
In the context of evaluating the Losees' claim, it is important to remember that a good
portion of the funds expended were utilized to construct a garage/shop building on the Lava
Home. The building is substantial, and increases the value of Appellees' property. In addition,
Appellants' Counterclaim, together with Rigby's affidavit, allege significant improprieties on the
part of the Losees, including fraud, diversion of Sky funds for their own use and benefit, and
mismanagement of company funds. It is also relevant that the $261,000 loan was made after
serions mismanagement issues by the Losees came to light. It is certainly reasonable, as
Appellants argued to the district court, that Idaho Company was reluctant to commit additional
f1mds at that juncture, and was having second thoughts as to the viability of Sky. 95 It is also
reasonable, as Idaho Company further argued, that it would not have advanced the funds, absent
the grant of security by the Lo sees. 96
The additional funding provided by Idaho Company constituted consideration for the
Promissory Note and Deed of Trust under any standard, and was a modification to the original
93
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contracts between the parties. This Court has held that "the doing by one of the parties of
something that he is not legally bonnd to do co11stitutes consideration for the other's promise to
modify the terms oftlle original agreement." 97 Under the terms of the original agreements
between the parties, Idaho Company was obliged to finance only $135,000 of Sky expenses. The
Losees were not obliged to repay that amount. However, as JoCarol Losee testified, there came
a time when $135,000 was not enough. She also testified that the garage/shop came to be an
expensive facility. 98 Presumably, part of the reason the Losees agreed to sign the Promissory
Note and Deed of Trust was so that the garage/shop could be finished, thereby enhancing the
value of their property. Again, these are matters to be presented and evaluated at trial, so that
factual questions can be fully explored and resolved. They were not matters that were ripe for
summary judgment at the time the district court made its determination.
The July 2004 agreements met all oftlle tests for mutuality of obligation. It is a wellestablished principle of contract law that "contracts do not necessarily give identical rights to all
parties. That is part of tlle bargaining process." 99 Whether or not the trial court, with the scant
evidence before it, believed the July 2004 agreements were fair or unfair, or were a good or bad
bargain for the Losees, could not be grounds for a grant of summary judgment, given the
enom1ity of the disputed facts in this case. The district court erred in granting partial summary
judgment in favor of the Losees.

"Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754,769,979 P.2d 627,642 (1998).
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R., Supp., pp. 83-85.
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Doughty v. Idaho Frozen Foods Corp., 1!2 ldaho 791, 794, 736 P.2d 460,463 (Ct. App. 1987).
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E.

The District Court Failed to Support its Judgment with Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law

In rendering an opinion, the trial court issued an extremely short three paragraph ruling
which stated rather simply "[a]fter reviewing the file, briefs, memorandums, affidavits,
pleadings, and the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby grants Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment." 100 The trial court failed to indicate what facts were so clear and
uncontroverted as to preclude a trial; indeed, it did not make any findings of fact at all. Neither
did the trial court clearly explain any basis for its. ruling, other than a general statement that it
had looked at all the pleadings and other papers within its file.
While there is no requirement under LR. C.P. 56 which mandates that an order of
summary judgment must contain findings of fact and a conclusion oflaw,

101

Rule 56 does

require, as a practical matter, that the trial court must have considered all material facts, and
found, after looking at all facts in deference to the non-moving party, that no genuine issue of
material fact existed and, as a matter of law, the claimant was entitled to sununary judgment.
Where no findings of fact nor conclusions of law were made in this matter and only a simple
reference to the materials reviewed was given, there is a lack of support for any supposition that
the trial court in this case perceived any material facts and then subsequently found that there
was no genuine issue of those material facts. Indeed, the order from the trial court does not even
state in the barest of terms that 'there is no genuine issue of material fact'. Without such a

100
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Bank of Idaho v. Nesseth, 104 Idaho 842, 664 P.2d 270 (1983), findings ordinarily are optional, not
mandatory, when rendering a summary judgment.
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determination, there is no way for this Court standing in review to evaluate whether the trial
court properly reached its conclusions by an exercise of reason. Appellants submit that it did
not.

F.

Appellants Should Be Awarded Their Attorneys Fees and Costs on Appeal

Attorneys fees and costs are specifically provided for in the Deed of Trust, Promissory
Note and Security Agreement, and should be awarded to Appellants pursuant to the contract
between the parties. 102
In the alternative, Appellants should be awarded their attorneys fees and costs pursuant to
LC.§§ 12-120 and 12-121. It is well-established law before this Court "that LC. §12-120
mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial." 103 In
this case, the Appellees brought two unsuccessful motions for remand, which were frivolous,
unreasonable and without foundation. 104 In addition, Appellees' motion for summary judgment
was based upon Mrs. Losee's affidavit testimony, which is in direct opposition to her previous
sworn testimony. Appellants should be awarded their reasonable attorneys fees and costs
incurred in this appeal.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The core problem with this case is that was that it was not an appropriate candidate for
summary judgment from the outset. Appellees failed to furnish the trial court with even the most
102
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356, 359, 128 P.3d 893, 896 (2005).
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basic outline of undisputed facts, and the affidavit they relied upon was contradicted by prior
testimony of the deponent. The district court failed to recognize that nearly every material fact
before it was in dispute. Instead, it apparently decided to go "behind the scenes" and weigh the
evidence or determine credibility of witnesses, which is not permitted at the summary judgment
stage.
Appellants were entitled to have the facts construed in the light most favorable to them,
as the nonmoving party. They were entitled to have all reasonable inferences drawn in their
favor. The district court failed to do either. The grant of partial summary judgment in favor of
Appellees should be reversed, and Appellants should be awarded their attorneys fees and costs
on appeal.

/
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this '2,,£ day of November, 2008.

E.W.J>ike I
''
E.W. Pike & Associates, P.A.
Attorneys for Appellants
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